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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
TRILBA A. JONES, Incompetent, 
by her Guardian Ad Litem, 
BONNIE JEWEL SHINER, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
SHARON COLBY KIEFER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 18339 
BRIEF OF APPELL.A.NT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Respondent brought action against Defendant/Appellant 
seeking to have certain deeds to real property !:.cld by defendant in the 
City of Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah, set aside, claiming that the 
first of these deeds was procured through fraud, duress, breach 
of fidicuary responsibility, and without fair and adequate 
consideration. The Plaintiff/Respondent further attacked the 
second deed claiming that the Defendant/Appellant took the property 
with knowledge of purported defects in the deed granting the 
property to her predecessor in interest, and that the grant of the 
property to Defendant/Appellant was without consideration. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, Judge, on December 8, 1981. Judgment was entered 
against defendant/appellant on January 8, 1982. A Motion for 
New Trial was filed·and an Order denying relief thereunder en-
tered on March 1, 1982. The judgment set aside and rendered 
null and void the deeds under which the defendant/appellant 
claimed intterest in and held the subject property. The Notice 
of Appeal was filed on March 30, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant/appellant (hereinafter "appellafit") requests 
that the judgment entered by the trial court be reversed and that 
the Supreme Court order the entry of judgment finding that the 
plaintiff/respondent (hereinafter "respondent") failed to meet 
the burden of proof required in the case, which would have the 
effect of reinstating the deeds set aside by the trial court's 
judgment and vest title to the subject property in appellant. 
STATEMENT OF" FACTS 
Plaintiff, Trilba A. Jones, was, at the date of trial 
in the within case, a 77 year old widow (T 10), her husband 
having died in 197>6. Mrs. Jones owned solely, after her 
husband's death, a home on certain real estate in Nephi, Juab 
County, Utah, more fully described as: 
The North half of Lot 3, Block 30, Plat "B", 
N~nhi Townsite Survey. 
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An abstract of title to the said property was received into 
evidence and showed, in relevant part, through a series of trans-
actions the following: 
(1) Grant L. Jones and Plaintiff, Trilba A. Jones were 
_deeded the property in question on June 8, 1970; 
(2) Trilba A. Jones granted the property to Millie Atkin 
Fordham Colby, by Warranty Deed, on March 3, 1978; 
(3) Millie Colby granted the property to Sharon Colby 
Kiefer, Defendant/Appellant herein, by Warranty Deed on June 30, 
1980. (Abstract of Title, Plaintiff's Exhibit - 2) 
Mrs. Jones continued to live alone in the home after her 
husband's death until January 31, 1978, when, while working as a 
baby-sitter for neighbors she fell and fractured her leg. (T 12) 
She was hospitalized at Moutain View Hospital, Payson, Utah, from 
that date for approximately two months. (Medical Records, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit - 1) While at the hospital she was frequently 
visited by family members and friends, including her daughter, 
Millie Colby. The Deed of March 3, 1980, was executed by Mrs. 
Jones while she was in the hospital. (T 15) 
Uncontested in the case was that the deeds of March 3, 1978, 
and June 30, 1980, transferring ownership of the subject property, 
respectively, to Millie Colby and then to Sharon Colby Kiefer were 
not purchases. It was fu~ther uncontested that the second deed 
was, legally, a gift. (T 88, 95) 
Millie Colby did not live in the house after the date of the 
deed and died on April 3, 1981. (T71) After releas-e from the 
hospital, Mrs. Jones liv.ed in the subject home until illness forced 
her to enter a rest home. (T 22) Mrs. Jones was transferred to a 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nursing _home in Salt Lake City in late 1979. (T 23) Appellant 
moved to the house on June 13, 1981, and lived there continuously 
until trial. (T 85) A petition for appointment of Conservator 
based on incompetency of Trilba A. Jones was filed in.the District 
Court of Salt Lake County. The conservatorship was denied. (T 54) 
No evidence was produced at the trial concerning a judicial 
decision on the incompetence of Mrs. Jones--whether based on phy-
sical disability or mental incapacity. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF 
VALIDITY INHERENT IN A DEI;IVERED, RECORDED DEED 
WITH CLEAR AND CONVINctt:NG PROOF AND THE FOLLOWING 
FINDINGS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The evidence established that the March 3, 1978, deed was 
delivered to Millie Colby at the time of its execution and 
subsequently recorded prior to the death of Mille Colby. (_T 15, 
Abstract of Title, Plaintiff's Exhibit - 2} The evidence further 
established that the deed of June 30, 1980, granting the subject 
property to appellant was recorded .. (Abstract of Title, Plaint-
iff''s Exhibit - 2) The delivery and recordation of a deed gives 
rise, under the law, to certain presumptions and establishes a 
special burden of proof to be met by one trying to invalidate 
the deed.. The presumption raised by the delivery of the deed 
is that of transfer of interest. In Allen.v. Allen, 115 Utah 
303, 204 P.2d 458 (1949), at 461, the Court stated: 
" * * * The recording of the deed and placing 
the names of others on the property is some-
what in the nature of a public declaration 
that she intended the instrument to become 
effective immediately. People as a rule do not 
deliberately put a flaw in the title to their Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
property, thereby handicapping its later dis-
posal, unless they really intend to transfer 
some interest to the person whose name is in 
the record. " 
The person who seeks to have a deed declared invalid must show 
proof greater than that normally required in a civil case. The 
person so asserting must show the invalidity by "clear and con-
vincing evidence." Northcrest, :1:rnc .. v. ,. Walker Bank and Trust 
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). 
Another general principal of law applicable to this case 
must be stated as a preamble to appellant's argument: this being 
an action in equity, the reviewing court must make a determina-
tion of the facts. 
" * * * th~s action to avoid deeds is 
one in equity upon which this court has both 
the prerogative and the duty to review and 
weigh. the evidence and determine the facts." 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d!811 (_Utah 1972) 
at 812. 
The context of the case shifts that burden to the appellant herein, 
appellant having attacked by the appeal the findings of fact made 
by the trial court: 
"However, in the practical application of that 
rule it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged. position of the 
trial court, in close proximity to the parties 
and the witnesses, there is indulged a presump-
tion of correctness of his findings and judgment, 
with the burden upon the appellant to show they 
were in error; and where the evidence is in con-
flict, we do not upset his findings merely be-
cause we may have reviewed the matter different-
ly, but do so only if the evidence clearly pre-
ponderates against them." id. 
It is the position of the appellant that the evidence 
produced at the trial clearly preponderated in the favor of the 
appellant and the judgment for respondent was not supported by 
-5- l j 
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the evidence:. 
The Court made specific findings as follows: 
(1) That the Incompetent did not have the requisite 
mental capacity to make a valid gift of her home and real 
property; or 
(2) She did not know she was making a gift; 
(3) That the Incompetent did not have the intent to 
convey the property to Millie Colby as her sole and separate 
property nor did she intend to make a gift of the property 
to Millie Colby to the exclusion of her rights and the rights 
of the other heirs; 
(4) That Millie Colby exercised duress on the Incompetent 
in procuring the deed to the subject property i 
(5) That persons who stood in fidicuary capacity to 
the Incompetent and who had a duty to tell her of the deed 
failed to do so; 
(6) That the transfer from Millie Colby to Defendant/ 
Appellant herein was without consideration. 
A. 
INCOMPETENCY OF TRILBA A. JONES, HFR 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THE DEED OF 
MARCH 3, 1978, AND HER INTENT TO CONVEY 
REE OWNERSHIP TO MILLIE COLBY BY GIFT 
The respondent attempted to show the incompetency of Trilba 
A. Jones on March 3, 1978, the date of the first deed, by intro-
ducing testimony from Mrs. Jones, herself, and from Bonnie Shiner. 
Also introduced was the medical record of Mrs. Jones' stay at 
Mountain View Hospital following the accident in which she broke Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is noteworthy in discussing the evidence produced at trial 
to show the incompetency of Mrs. Jones that no medical testimony 
was. offered, even though the respondent had, at pre-trial confen-
ence, given the names of physicians respondent would produce at 
trial to establish her ino.ompetence. (Transcript of Pre-Trial 
Hearing~ 7,8) Listed were a Dr. Mendenhall, the physician treat-
ing Mrs. Jonesa fracture, and a Dr. MacDonald, an internist. Fur-
ther, the very_ denomination of the parties claims the incompetence 
of Mrs. Jones. The record of evidence at trial, however, is 
devoid of proof that there has been a judicial determination of 
Mrs. Jones' incompetence. Paragraph 2 of respondent's Complaint 
alleges1 and was admitted by appellant, that application had been 
made to the District Court of Salt Lake County for appointment of 
a conservator. But the evidence at trial was that the appointment 
had been denied. (T 54, 73) Bonnie Shiner appeared as Guardian Ad 
Litem for Mbs. Jones based on an ex-parte application alleging 
Mrs. Jones' incompetency"by reason of "mental deficiency, loss 
of memory, physical illnes or disability and advanced age." The 
application is dated May 29, 1981. It is endorsed by the alleged 
incompetent Mrs. Jones who nominates Bonnie Shiner therein as her 
guardian ad litem. Mrs. J"ones appeared and testified at the trial. 
(T 10-33) Respondent, it appears, has taken an inconsistent pos-
tion in the trial as to the issue of Mrs. Jones' competency gener-
ally. 1 If she).:r indeed, as the Pebit±on i.for Appointment as Guardian 
Ad Liteml'would indicate, was mentally: incompetent on May 29, 1981, 
and suffered from loss of memory, what was her competency to 
be a witness in this case on December 8, 1981? Utah Code Anno. 
(1953) §78-24-2 states: 
-7-
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"WHO MAY NOT BE WITNESSES.--The following persons 
cannot be witnesses: (1) Those who are of unso·und 
mind at the time of their production for examin-
ation. * * * 11 
Reading of the evidence produced by respondent shows that re-
spondent would have it accepted that Mrs. Jones was competent 
as of December 8, 1981, when she testified at the trial since 
respondent's arguments placed heavy reliance on the testimony 
of Mrs. Jones as to the events of March 3, 1978, ~ut the whole 
thrust of respondent~s case is to attempt to show that Mrs. Jones 
was incompetent while in the hospital and again within a year 
th~reafter. It is only from the allegations of paragraph 2 
of the Complaint ·and the denomination of the parties, that the 
incompetency of Mrs. Jones, generally, can be inferred. While 
that is not the crucial issue in the case, respondent's attempt 
to infer incompetency on March 3, 1978, from the foregoing may 
be questioned and, on review, falls short of such inference. 
As to the specific factual issue of the case, Mrs. Jones' 
competency on March 3, 1978, both parties offered evidence. 
Mrs. Jones testified, in essence, that she signed the deed 
at her daughter, Millie Colby's request, without explanation 
from Millie Colby as to the nature of that document. (T 15, 16) 
Mrs. Jones testified that she later discovered the fact of .the 
deed when she attempted to sell the house. (T 16) Contrary 
testimony was given by Defendant/Appellant's witness, Harold 
Harmer, the Administrator at Mountain View Hospital, and the 
Notary Public whose signature appears on the March 3, 1982, 
deed. Mr. Harmer testified to his practice in relation to 
-8-
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notarization of patients' signatures on documents while in the 
hospital: 
A: It was always my practice to review the 
document that they wer~ signing and ask them if 
they understood thoroughly what they were signing. 
And whenever I did and could I advised them that 
this may or may not hold up in court. But I did 
want them to know how serious the document was. 
(T 75) 
Mr. Harmer further testified: 
Q: (By Mr. Anderson, Defendant/Appellant's trial 
attorney) OK. Alright. Now, do you recall talking 
with Trilba Jones about this deed? 
A: Well, I couldn't list any specifics that I 
might have told her; but I recall doing this, 
everytime that I ever notorized a document of 
this nat ul'!"e, that I went through it thoroughly 
with the patient to see if they understood. 
(T 75 - 76) 
. * * * 
A: And I couldn't remember any details. But, 
no, I do not remember that she seemed confused 
or did not understand. If that had of [sic] been 
the case, I would not have notorized her signature 
if she had not understood what I was telling her. 
(T 78) 
On cross examination by Mr. Ables, Plaintiff/Respondent's 
attorney, Mr. Harmer testified: 
Q: Well, you review the document, anyhow, before 
the person signs it? 
A: I review it with the patient. I take, I sit 
there by the bed and review it with the patient 
and tell them what they are signing, that this is 
a deed, that you are deeding a home, and -- (T 79) 
* * * 
Q: Then you tell them also about how serious the 
document is, is that, you testify to that? 
A: Well, I.told them that they were deeding, that 
she was deeding her home. 
* * * 
-9-
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,,.,, :__~~ :::"~.:-:~::r words, was it your testimony here that 
M~s. Jo~es was not confused at the time you had her 
sign this deed? 
A: I don't believe that she was. If she were, I 
question that I would have gone ahead with the 
notarization of her signature. (T 80) 
Further evidence contrary to the testimony of Mrs. 
Jones was given by Defendant/Appellant's witness, Anita 
Lynn Luke, a registered nurse who witnessed the deed: 
A: I recall that Mr. Harmer asked her questions, 
and she seemed to answer intelligently. · 
Q: And you were satisfied as a witness? 
A: Yes they[sic] she knew she was signing. (T 84) 
The very denomination of the case name and the allegation of 
incompetency in the Petition for Appointment as Guardia~ Ad 
Litem, stating that Mrs. Jones was mentally deficient and suf-
ferred from loss of memory tend to impeach the evidence offered 
by the respondent as to the. value _of Mrs. Jones' testimony at 
trial. Tbe test tb.-=.det:e.~mine, ·:.in the conte~t of a. deed, the 
competency of the signer is set forth in Peterson v. Carter, 
579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978), at 331: 
"The test whether granter has sufficent mental 
capacity to make a deed is: Were mental faculties 
so deficient or· impaired that there was not suf-
ficient power to comprehend the subject of the 
deed, its nature. and its probable consequences, and 
to act with discretion in relation thereto, or with 
relation to ordinary affairs of life?" 
The evidence offered by the. respondent to, positively, prove 
the incompetency of Mrs. Jones on March 3, 1978, fails to 
meet the burden of proof required. Aside from her statements 
"jutt a paper--sign it," the respondent offered only scant 
reference to the medical record and the conclusory observations 
of Bonnie Shiner. (T 4 5) 
-10-
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The testimony of Mrs. Jones at trial, if she was, in-
deed, competent,: is subject to question for it is, overwhelming-
ly, self-serving. If it is accepted, she would again hold title 
to the property. Cross-examination disclosed more memory oS 
the circumstances of signing~ Mrs. Jones was questioned as 
to the visit of a Provo attorney, Mr. Ronald Stanger, concerning 
the drawing up of a deed while she was at the hospital. At first 
Mrs. Jones did not recall his visit but later admitted signing 
a check in payment (T 26) and the visit: 
Q: A11 right. Do you remember him talking 
to you about drawing up a deed and you paying 
him this check? 
A. Yes. (T 2 7) 
On redirect examination Mrs. Jones disclosed: 
Q: And so it was your idea then to go ahead anc 
to deed the property away to Millie? 
A: Yes, but Millie's dead now. (T 29) 
Apparently not satisfied with the foregoing answer, respondent's 
counsel continued: 
Q: Well, that doesn't make--Was it your idea to go 
ahead and give ti to her? 
A: I don't remember nothing, Wendell. I knew Millie 
would make it. (T 29) 
Mrs. Jones then continues .·;to rely on her present lack of memory. 
(T 30) But, on recross, the followin(}:was stated: 
Q: Mrs. Jones, now, Millie is dead now? 
A:,,Right. 
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Q: That's ri'ght. Ad · 't 't t h n isn · i rue t at you gave 
her the house and that you wanted her to have the 
house, but now that she's dead you want it back; is 
that right? 
A: That's correct. 
In Controlled Receivables , Inc. v. Harman, 413 P.2d 807, 
at 810, the Court, referring in note 9 to Allen v. Allen, supra, 
stated: 
" * * * this court observed that the facts were con-
sistent with forgetfulness or misunderstanding of the 
legal effect by the grantor of what she did or with a 
change of mind or desire at a subsequent date, but 
that they were not necessarily probative of a know-
ledge that she did not convey or did not intend to 
convey her land at the time. "· 
Appellant, too, offered evidence of the competency of Mrs .. 
Jones before and after the accident: Mrs. Jones lived alone in 
the Nephi house poth before hospitalization (T 11) and after re-
lease for over a year (T 22); that she had employment as a baby-
sitter before the accident (T 21) and could even care for a re-
tarded child (Tl2); that after the accident she took and passed 
a driver's license examination and resumed driving her car (T 22) .. 
While not made a SfJ~cific finding, the appellant stipula-
ted at pre-trial hearing that no cash consideration was given 
for the Jones to Colby deed. But that does now exclude that 
there was non-cash consideration. The record indicates that 
Millie Colby, after the hospitalization of Mrs. Jones, contin-
ued to be supportive of her and that Mrs. Jones had come to 
expect that. (T 28) In Jordan v. Jordan, 445 P.2d 765 (Utah 
1968) at 766, this Court has stated: " * * * love and af-
f ection and the ensuing actions of parties represented good 
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Further, as to the J?oint of lack on consideration for the Jones 
to Colby deed, no citation to case law is required to support 
the position that property may be transferred by gift alone. 
B. 
Ll\CK OF TRILBA JONES' INTENT TO TRANSFER 
THE PROPERTY TO', THE EXCLUSION OF HER RIGHTS 
AND THE RIGHTS OF HER OTHEF. HEIRS THEREIN 
The :5.inding __ is made i by the Court that Mrs. Jones did not 
intend, by the deed of March 3, 1978, to grant title to Millie 
Colby to the exclusion of her own rights and the rights of others. 
The finding, in effect, is an alternative hypothesis by the Court 
and challenges the findings of Mrs. Jones' incompetency and lack 
of knowledge. That she intended to "give the property to Millie~:: 
is supported by quotations from the transcript, supra. That this 
necessarily would affect her rights therein is apparant. The 
problem in analyzing the trial court's reasoning is that this 
position is inconsistent with the findings previously d~scussed. 
If Mrs. Jones was incompetent or if she did not know what she 
was doing, then the transfer is void. The instant finding must-
rely on the assumption~' that Mrs. Jones was competent and did 
know what she was doing, but that she did the act of signing the 
deed for some other purpose than delivery of title. Such a posi-
tion is not supported by the record. Mrs. Jones offered no such 
testimony. Respondent attempted to use the testimony of Mairiam 
Winn, a granddaughter of Mrs. Jones, to support some type of 
informal trust arrangement but that testimony was ordered stricken 
by the Court. (T 71) 
-13-
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Further testimony was offered trhough Mairiam Winn that 
Millie Colby would deed the property back to a conservator for 
Mrs. Jones. (T 67,68) This testimony is of no value in support-
ing the finding by the Court. It is, if accurate, only a repre-
sentation of Millie Colby's then state of mind and not the intent 
of her granter. Further, it was based on the premise that there 
would be a conservatorship--which was never completed. (T 54,73) 
It cannot be used to infer the mind of Trilba Jones on March 3, 
1978. 
That a deed can be construed an some way·1.1.asr Mill runs counter 
to the presumption in favor of the validity and recordation of 
instruments of conveyance. Jordan v. Jordan, supra. 
The Court's finding is further without support in that it 
presupposes some specific intent of Mrs. Jones concerning the 
house in question. The 1965 will of Mrs. Jones was introduced 
by respondent, apparantly to show a "share and share alike" 
intent on the part of Mrs. Jones. (Exhibit 7) A "Statement 
Giving Power of Attorney" dated February 23, 1978, contains 
similar language but no specific mention of the house and pro-
perty. Exhibit 9) The record contains mention of other property 
of Mrs. Jones in the form of bank accounts, a note receivable, 
etc. (T 41, 55) That testamentary documents are as transitory 
as the prior disp9sition of ·property make them is universally 
accepted. The testator may exclude certain property from equal 
division distribution among his heirs either by making specific 
bequests, gifts or devises in the will itself or by making other 
disposition outside of the will which ne1jates equal distribution 
of his estate. In fact, the effect of transfer by deed is to keep 
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property out of·' the estate per se. And, that one may change 
one's mind by subsequent, contrary act is inherent in the law 
of will$. 
c. 
THE DEED OF MARCH 3, 1978, WAS THE 
PRODUCT OF DURESS EXERCISED BY MILLIE 
COLBY ON TRILBA JONES 
The Court found that duress was employed by Millie Colby 
on Trilba Jones to obtain the March 3, 1978, deed. The testimony 
of respondent's own witness, Mairian Winn, indicates otherwise. 
She testified that.the idea for the deed originated in the mind 
of Trilba Jones. (T 68, 69) That evidence is contrary to the 
position that duress:;was the cause of the deed since duress as-
sumes the forcing of the will of Millie Colby on Trilba Jones 
and not vice-versa. 
The evidence apparantly produced by respondent for support 
of this finding is contained in the testimony of Mrs~ Jones, 
herself. It is subject all of the questions that are raised, 
supra. It is significant here, as there, that Mrs. Jones 
repeatedly stated: "I don't know what I done." CT 30) Mrs. Jones, 
however, on :direct ,e;xaminatidn.~-:. did admit, as discussed, supra; 
Q: And so it was your idea them to go ahe~d 
and deed the property to Millie? 
A: Yes, but Millie's dead now. (T 29) 
Evidence that was, apparantly, offered as prelimary to show duress 
was offered by Bonnie Shiner (T 39-47) but was objected to (T 39, 
48) and ruled as inadmissible. (T 48) As a result, the respondent 
did not produce evidence to support the 
-1~-
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D. 
PERSONS WITH A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO TRILBA 
JONES FAILED IN THE DUTY TO INFORM HER 
OF THE DEED OF MARCH 3, 1978 
The court makes a finding which, in its terms, may apply, 
to parties other than the appellant's predeceasor in interest, 
Millie Colby. Does this finding mean that the Notary Public 
before whom Trilba Jones signed the deed in question failed to 
inform her of its import? Or that the hospital personnel, gen-
erally failed to protect her interests? Appellant's search of 
the Utah Code and decisional law fails to show such a duty. 
The only "i::erson"to whom the finding could refer is Millie Colby. 
The testimony of Trilba Jones was tha.t she discovered the 
existence of the March 3, 1978, deed only when she attempted to 
sell the subject property. (T 16) The discussion, supra, is 
replete with references to and comments on the testimony of 
Trilba Jones with respect to her memory at trial of prior 
events and the purposes she may have had in so testifying,and 
will not be repeated here but has parallel application to this 
argument. It is the appellant's position that Trilba Jones 
did know of the deed at the time of its execution~and that 
this finding, based on a position to the contrary, is without 
basis in the evidence0when the evidence is taken as a whole. 
-The law concerning confidential relationships is well established 
in Utah decisional law. In Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710 
(Utah-1965), the heirs of the decedent attacked a deed granting 
property which otherwise would have passed on the decedents death 
wherein a non-heir received the property. The grantee was a 
perssn raised as a family member by the decedent granter and his 
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wife, a party to the suit. At 713 the Court stated: 
"The evidence is undisputed that there existed 
among the parties [to the deed]_ sincere affection, 
trust and confidence, but is this legally sufficient 
to constitute a confidential relationship giving 
rise to a presumption that the transaction was 
unfair? We think not. 
The mere relationship of parent and child does not con-
stitute evidence of such confidential relation-
ship as to create a presumption of fraud or undue 
influence. While ··kinshfu.p may be a factor in deter-
mining the existence of a legally significant con-
fidential relationship, there must be a showing, 
in addition to kinship, a reposal of confidence 
by one party and the resulting superiority and in-
f 1 uence ori the other party. " 
In Bradbury the Court found that no such relationship existed. 
In that case, as here, there was intervention by an attorney. 
Bradbu11ry:fu.t:ther stat:J.es the law as: 
"The confidence must be reposed by one under such 
circumstances as to create a corresponding duty 
* * * and it must result in a situation where as 
a··matter of fact there is superior influence on one 
side and dependence on the other."id. 
The appellant argued, at t~ial~ that such a relationship was not 
established by the facts. While there was a Power of Attorney 
created, the evidence fails to show that the deed in question 
was executed by Millie Colby under that power. Rather, it bears 
the name of Trilba Jones and, according to testimony from both 
parties' witnesses, including Trilba Jones, herself, was the idea 
of Trilba Jones. There was testimony that Millie Colby afilded 
Mrs. Jones in her financial matters but the evidence discloses 
only situations where checks were prepared for household ex-
penses of Mrs. Jones but the signature thereon was always that 
of Mrs. Jones. Such is not the "substitution of the will of 
-17-
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one over another. 
But, assuming, arguendo, that such a relationship.may be 
reasonably found from the evidence, was there breach of its 
duties by the superior party in the execution of the March 3, 
1978, deed which should_result in its invalidity? The court, 
in Peterson v. Carter, supra, at 331, ruled: "[Undue influence] 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the grantee 
exercised a dominating influence over the granter." The evi-
dence preponderates to the appellant in this question. 
E. 
THE TRANSFER TO APPELLANT BY. MILLIE 
COLBY WAS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION 
The appellant admitted that she was not a bona fide pur-
chaser for value. Appellant further, however, asserted at the 
pre-trial hearing and showed in the trial that she had received 
the subject property by gift from her mother, Millie Colby. 
That position, per se, does not invalidate her claim so long 
as the claim of Millie Colby is deuermined valid. See Jordanv. 
·Jordan, s.upra. 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON .GROUNDS :r: ! , 
OF SURPISE BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
RESPONDENT'S WITNESS, MAIRIAM WINN 
The re~pondent's intent to call Mairiam Winn as a witness 
in her case in chief was not disclosed at the pre-trial hearing. 
Her testimony was objected to on grounds amounting to surprise 
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on the raising of a new issue. (T 69,70) The court overruled 
the objection and allowed the testimony. After trial the ap-
pellant filed her Motion for New Trial, supported with affidavits 
of her former counsel, Mr. Gary Anderson, and Clint Colby, a 
witness sought to be called in rebuttal to the testimony of 
Mairiam Winn.. That motion was denied by the Court. Rule 99, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure., provides that " * * * a new trial may 
be granted on * * * all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take addi tonal testimony * * *: ( 3) '•Accident 
or surprise,. which, '.Ordinary prudence could not have guarded against." 
The issue in question was the establishment of a trust or other 
fiduciary relationship which was not plead in the Complaint or 
established as an issue at the pre-trial hearing (Transcript of 
Pre-Trial Hearing, 9) without objection from appellant. Denial 
of. the Motion for New Trial, under the circumstances of the find-
ings actually made by the Court, cannot be considered "harmless 
error." Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra, at 814. 
III 
THE COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING IN 
THE TRIAL EVIDENCE AS TO A FIDUCIARY 
RELATIONSHIP 
At pre-trial conference in this case appellant's counsel 
ojected to the issue of fiduciary relationship being included 
as an issue in the ti.ial. {Transcript of Pre-Trial Hearing, 9) 
Further, appellant objected to the introduction of evidence in 
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relation to that issue (T 69, 70) The Court overruled both the 
objection at pre-trial and at trial. The appellant asserts this 
is error since the issue in question was not framed by the plead-
ings and therefore not rightly before the court. This is not 
"harmless error" since the Court entered a specificifinding on 
this very issue. 
The law is clear that not all error is grounds for reversal, 
especially in a non-jury trial. In Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra, 
at 814, the Court stated, that in non-jury trials " * * * the 
trial judge has superior knowledge as to the competency and effect 
which should be given evidence, and that he will make his findings 
and decision in conformity therewith." The inquiry to make, the 
\, Court continued, " * * * is whether there was error of a suf-
ficiently substantial nature that it is reasonable to believe that 
it adversly affected the appellant or deprived him of a fair trial 
in such a way that in the absence of such error there is a reason-
able likelihood that the outcome would have been different." id. 
In .an appeal of a decison of the District Court sitting as a court 
in equity, the reviewing powers of the Supreme Court are heightened 
in this area. 
Appellant asserts that the error was reversible ana, at least, 
the case should have been reopened for rebuttal testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant asserts that the evidence, taken as a whole, 
does not support the findings in favor of respondent made by 
the trial court and that the judgment should be vacated and re-
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versed. In the alternative, the appellant asserts that the trial 
Court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of 
Mairiam Winn concerning a fiduciary relationship between the par-
ties over the objec~ion of appellant's trial counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi's 26th day of July, 1982. 
~iWunooo~ 
ROBERT J. SC~CHER 
Attorney f~Ap~ellant 
81 East Ceri~er s)treet 
Provo, Utah ~l 
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